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September 25, 2008

whose mobility?

with this summer's iPhone 3G from Apple and Google's latest unveiling of the G1 smartphone, mobility seems to be the current communications tech buzzword, especially for so-called social media. having just acquired a new iPhone myself, i admit i'm pretty excited by its possibilities -- continuous data, location-based services, and a superslick interface that may indicate the future of touch-based interfaces. i've been especially impressed by the free applications offered by established social media sites, like Facebook, MySpace, Last.fm, and Twitter. where internet services have tended to focus on web-based applications, the iPhone redirects usage back to standalone apps which implement their own framework while drawing on networked content.

i find myself updating my Facebook and checking my Myspace messages more often, as the iPhone apps are often quicker and cleaner than their web-based counterparts, and more fun to use. i'm titillated (and a little creeped out) by how Yelp and Google Maps can now figure out where i am, and deliver data specific to my location. i'm beginning to envision how devices like the iPhone and G1 might allow for more constant engagement and interactivity with peers -- as long as, of course, they also own the pricey equipment and pay for the data subscription (not to mention having a working wireless network, which neither AT&T nor T-Mobile consistently provide).

this brings me to my current question concerning increasing mobility -- whose mobility is at stake here? the "digital divide" between technological haves and have-nots may not be a foreign concept in tech circles, but it's not one that has been very well addressed either, as it's often chalked up to socio-economic inequities that must be solved separately. certainly it's not surprising that tricked-out web-capable smartphones are mostly available to consumers in the upper social strata (with devices starting at $179 and combined voice/data plans running $55/month and up). moreover, social and geographic mobility have often been the purview of the middle (and upper middle) classes, those who are more likely to leave home for college, take jobs in different cities, and establish themselves far away from their extended families.

migration, of course, is a reality for many working-class people in the US and abroad, whose ability to earn a living is often tied to the movement of global capital. the demands of the global market tend to drive mass labor migrations, as people must move to find jobs that can support them and their families -- often living far from home and working abroad illegally (from migrant Mexican and Central American laborers in the US, to domestic workers in Europe and the Gulf states who come from South Asia, the Phillipines, and elsewhere). mobility per se may not be limited to those with greater resources, but voluntary mobility is still a privilege.

yet by contrast, mobile communications technologies have precisely been adopted in places where more extensive infrastructure may not exist. in the US, for instance, mobile phones were adopted first by younger users, partly because they're less likely to have their own landline (or own a home), and also because cell phone carriers began offering pre-paid plans that made phones accessible to those without steady incomes (the Pew Internet Project has some interesting reports on cell phone and internet use among different American demographics, though their methodology is limited to phone interviews, and they appear to conflate race with regional ethnic identity). outside the industrialized world, furthermore, mobile phones increasingly provide communications access to low-income regions and neighborhoods where landlines are simply unavailable. according to this article on MobileActive.org, for example, Brazilians living in favelas (slums) have taken up cell phone use, as have low-income youth in South Africa. free incoming calls and text messaging make mobile phones useable where landlines aren't, and encourage different ways of engaging with mobile technologies. according to Jeffrey Juris' review, The Cell Phone: An Anthropology of Communication, shows how mobile phones in Jamaica allow low-income users to intensify their social networks in beneficial ways.

what's clear is that mobile technologies are used differently by different groups, often in ways not intended or imagined by marketers or tech companies. marginalized populations are probably less likely to be targeted by companies like Apple or Google, but at the same time, new technologies do present novel possibilities for social interaction at multiple social strata. text messaging, as the New York Times anxiously warned last week, is on the rise, often over and against voice calls, while improved handheld devices might actually provide web access to those who can't afford more expensive computer equipment (though Apple and Google for now are both assuming their devices will be paired with a home computer and broadband connection). mobility may turn out to mean more than just the latest toys for those of us who can afford them, and perhaps suggests an emerging way to think about and analyze new patterns in technology practice.

March 15, 2007

digi-pedia: wikipedia's digital hegemony

the other day on NPR, i heard a brief segment about Wikipedia, and how conservative critics have put together an online alternative called "Conservapedia," supposedly in correction to the "liberal bias" rampant in the former. i would believe that many of Wikipedia's articles reproduce liberal perspectives, particularly the academically-informed entries which tend to reflect leftist scholarly criticism, but i'm not convinced that this kind of "bias" needs to be "balanced" by an opposite conservative opinion. the polarized political spectrum doesn't always represent two equally valid critical positions. or maybe i've just been reading too much Althusser.

still, clearly Wikipedia cannot offer a neutrally produced body of knowledge -- all knowledge is situated and specific to the contexts in which it emerged. Wikipedia is necessarily a result of the communities that collaborate on it -- particularly those that are technologically enabled, and often academically informed. establishing "Conservapedia" strikes me as a bit fruitless, since once you assert your political position openly, you've already marked your ideas in a particular way. i suspect that the original site will maintain its dominant ground as the unmarked, normative version which most people will prefer. it's bad enough when students try to use Wikipedia as an academic reference -- imagine those who try to support their arguments with an explicitly biased source!

Conservapedia aside, i'm also not convinced that "bias" is the most pressing issue limiting Wikipedia's legitimacy. i'm interested more in its overall structure as a site of knowledge production -- in particular, what kinds of entries are created in the first place? i've noticed an increasing number of individual figures with their own Wikipedia page (especially those who are well-known online, like jwz, danah boyd, and howard rheingold), as well as night clubs, internet memes, and various contemporary yet transient topics. should every person, place, and concept ultimately have its own page? of course, entries on Wikipedia tend to reflect its users' predilections for all things digitally mediated, a tendency i think is more significant than any alleged "liberal bias."

generally, i accept the premise that Wikipedia's content is regulated by an interactive style of editing that allows users to continually tweak and rewrite entries according to their own level of engagement with a given topic, and i'm often impressed by the quality of articles on historical figures, terms from critical theory, and general knowledge of popular culture, all of which make the encyclopedia incredibly useful for general reference. but at what point does it become a promotional site for certain kinds of people and ideas, or an archive of internet fads? the open editing process of a wiki can't exercise much influence over what kinds of entries are useful or appropriate, something that more traditional editing might allow. interestingly, Wikipedia has been using "dis-ambiguation" pages recently to clarify related terms and redirect users to pages of interest. i think this highlights some of the possible drawbacks of an interactive, communally produced reference work. perhaps the proliferation of pages will be managed through user interest and will self-regulate in practice, but it's worth considering how interactive and collaborative sites of knowledge may privilege certain trends, ideas, and information over others. Wikipedia's conservative detractors are feeling nervous precisely because of that potential ability to dominate popular thought.

February 27, 2007

the special generation

i woke up this morning to more social anxiety about youth -- this time, NPR's Day to Day was covering a recent study which claims that "[college] students today are more narcissistic and self-centered than a generation ago." now, my mother assures me that she never told me i was special, so perhaps i escaped the worst of the "self-esteem movement." but according to psychologists at San Diego State, this recent trend can be traced to the indiscriminate emphasis on self-esteem and praise popular in parenting during the 80s. of course, the researchers then went on to add that this growing narcisissism is "fueled by current technologies such as MySpace and YouTube." ah, technological determinism.

at the risk of tooting the same tinny horn all the time, this just clamors "social anxiety! social anxiety!" the study purports to have relied on the "Narcissistic Personality Inventory," in which over 16,000 college-age students were surveyed between 1982 and 2006 using this psychological evaluation survey. admittedly, i tend to be wary of this kind of quantitative data, largely due to my own investments in ethnography and qualitative methods. what does it really tell us that students are increasingly agreeing with statements like "I think I am a special person" and "I can live my life any way I want to?" could this represent a part of larger cultural shifts in how we conceive of ourselves in American society? does this index actually indicate anything about social and behavioral changes, and is it sufficient to assess such cognitive trends?

but now i'm confused, because only a few days ago, APA researchers were all worked up about the negative effects of media on girl's self-esteem -- so it self-esteem good, or bad? or are researchers just bandying the term about without careful definition? given the cultural specificity of Western conceptions of selfhood, some care and clarity would be welcomed here. still, lead author Jean Twenge seems to think that today's youth are less empathic and more self-centered, and cautions that this shift could have damaging ramifications for society generally. as i've said before, youth are often a site where social anxieties are expressed concerning social reproduction, and youth are frequently and vaguely blamed for social changes that many find threatening. but are youth initiating these changes, or products of them?

the best part of this morning's interview with Twenge was when she claimed to hold the media responsible first, then parents and schools. ah, of course. but which media? that's right, magazines and television, in particular those that pander to youth. at no time did she point out that those media are generated for the sake of attracting advertising revenues, and that corporate interests tend to shape the media through which they promote their products. lastly, of course, Twenge includes MySpace and YouTube as proof that media are increasingly capitalizing on the narcissistic tendencies of today's youth, sites which revolve around individual identity. but perhaps these websites embody the same kind of cultural shifts that lead students to respond differently to the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. before asserting that changing attitudes signal dangerous trends in personal relationships, clearly closer research is needed to investigate how young people conceive of themselves, how they relate to others, and how they use (and produce) media.

November 18, 2006

surveiling the surveillant

as danah boyd mentioned in her blog today, an Iranian student was tasered by campus police at UCLA last Tuesday, triggering protests from the student body. the event, however, was captured by a student's video phone, and quickly disseminated around the internet and on television networks. by Thursday night, a friend of mine was showing me the clip on Youtube, whose video-sharing capabilities had undoubtably facilitated circulation. as Roxanne Varzi, a professor of Iranian studies and visual anthropology at UC Irvine said to me, emerging media technologies such as camera phones and video sites now allow the surveilled to become the surveillant.

media analysis aside, i hope the exposure of this event leads to a meaningful investigation of the actions of the UCLA police, and to thinking more critically about the ways in which some students (middle eastern, students of color, etc.) are treated, especially in our current political climate of fearmongering.

July 23, 2006

Authentic Youth: Cultural Capital and Credibility in Digital Youth Culture

(from a proposed paper on the role of digital media in the lives of young people)

For young people, commodity culture offers an important site for the production of individual and collective meanings. Digital spaces such as the internet provide an excellent arena for do-it-yourself culture and creative consumption, but are ultimately structured by the same logics that determine how popular culture operates more generally. Discourses of credibility and authenticity afford us a glimpse into how young people navigate the complex interplay of social networks, cultural commodities, and subcultures in a mobile, mediated society. Given the role of cultural engagement in developing social capital, digital media offer a means for young people to become more invested in their social and cultural worlds.

Continue reading "Authentic Youth: Cultural Capital and Credibility in Digital Youth Culture" »

March 29, 2006

myspace -- not just for pedophiles anymore!

An interesting tidbit in the news this week -- apparently, students in SoCal relied on MySpace and other digital media (email, txts, IM, etc.) to organize extensive walkouts Tuesday and Monday protesting proposed new immigration legislation.

From the LA Times:
"The protests appeared to be loosely organized, with students learning about them through mass e-mails, fliers, instant messages, cellphone calls and postings on myspace.com Web pages."

the Modesto Bee:
"At Ceres High, students spread word of the protest through the popular teen Web site MySpace.com."

and the San Diego Union-Tribune:
"Cpl. Dennis Gutierrez, a department spokesman, said students were well organized because they were communicating through the myspace.com Web site."

Not that this represents a new use of digital communications to organize protesters or coordinate masses of people -- Howard Rheingold has written about and documented "smart mobs," amorphous groups of people that cooperate and behave intelligently, despite their size and lack of centralized organization. But this may be the first highly publicized use of MySpace to help give students a political voice.

Hopefully, this recent application will suggest some of the positive possibilities for sites like MySpace, and other techno-social activities like texting and instant messaging. Maybe it will even offset some of the negative publicity and moral panics that the media have been fanning lately. Instead of stressing out about the (low) risk of internet pedophiles, or indulging in fears about inappropriate online behaviors for teens, we should focus on how social networking sites and digital media can facilitate meaningful community for young people, contributing to increased social connections and thereby fostering social engagement.

November 10, 2005

online video and the future of television

Recently, I decided to try the new iTunes video downloading feature. I don't have a video iPod, but I realized I could probably just watch the episodes on my monitor at home. Since moving into a very small studio apartment in San Francisco, I've opted to have a flat-panel computer display instead of a television, since I use my computer as my primary work and media tool (which conveniently doubles as a DVD player). I've forgone television and cable for high-speed internet (wirelessly, of course) and Netflix. This setup works great for movies, and even older television shows which area available on DVD. At first, I thought this arrangement would suffice, while harboring fantasies of buying a USB TV tuner down the line.

But to my surprise, I miss TV. Or rather, I miss parts of TV. Not the surfing around part, finding little of interest and settling for some mediocre piece of shock voyeurism or info-tainment. But I do miss my occasional evening bouts with decent dramas like The West Wing, or my guilty pleasure, Veronica Mars. I'm still not sure I want a TV – I find it too easy to be sucked into sense-dulling shows, regularly interrupted by abrasive, instrusive commercials (with a few clever exceptions). So instead, I've turned to that joy of modern living, the Internet. The iTunes store now makes recent episodes of select network shows (like Lost) available for download, although at a relatively low resolution intended for the new iPods. The files are quick enough to download, and run only $1.99 a pop -- but the cost adds up over the course of a season, especially given the low quality of the files (at 22 episodes a season, you'd end up paying about the same as if you waited and bought the much higher-quality DVD). And if more shows were available, and you bought five a week, suddenly the cost begins to rival some cable packages.

So financially, iTunes may not yet be proffering a workable model for purchasing individual, ad-free shows online rather than through cable television (or attempting to tune in with an antenna!). By contrast, of course, peer-to-peer networking technology has already expanded to fill this gap somewhat -- I can easily go online and use a program like Bit Torrent to take advantage of "distributed networks," where files are uploaded and downloaded over a dispersed network of users. Undoubtably, the entertainment industry will feel pressured to formulate some response to the increasing availability of digital media files, as the RIAA did when faced with the rise of Napster and the popularity of MP3s. But what does internet file-sharing mean for the television industry? TV programming is produced primarily with the revenue from ad sales, which in turn are funded by marketing budgets that depend on product sales. Ultimately in television, the viewing audience becomes the product sold to advertisers, and the money we spend on consumer goods supports those viewing habits.

For now, of course, most people will continue to buy bigger, thinner TVs and pay for cable, even as new business models show promise, like the iTunes store and Netflix. But will the lure of ad-free, easily acquired shows erode the advertising model on which television currently depends? Moreover, will a feasible price-point suffice to meet programming budgets? I wonder, though, about the effect dwindling outlets for advertising will have on the consumer economy. Will GoogleAds simply replace TV and radio advertising, listed visibly on podcasting and bit-torrenting sites? Or will the consumption of "durable" goods slowly decline as music, movies and TV shows are increasingly available directly in digital format, sans paid advertising? Then again, perhaps a model in which consumers purchase digital media directly from producers will have a "democritizing" effect, a benefit long proclaimed by proponents of an internet society. While I have little sympathy for the RIAA or the entertainment industry giants (five of whom control 90% of all television channels, publishing houses, record labels, and most other media outlets), I'm deeply curious as to what the impact of slippery new digital media technologies will have on such a signficiant chunk of our media-saturated economy.

As a side note, after writing this (but before I'd had a chance to post), I heard a tidbit on Marketplace yesterday about a leaked memo from Microsoft. Apparently, I'm not the only one giving this issue some thought -- it looks like the Associated Press and Redmond's finest are teaming up to provide news video online. Sounds like executives at both companies are nervous about new technology outstripping older business models.

October 21, 2005

Techno-Sociality: The myth of technology's role in social alienation

Steven Winn in the San Francisco Chronicle yesterday reiterated a sentiment that goes increasingly unchallenged as iPods, cell phones and WiFi-enabled laptops proliferate: that all these gadgets produce an increasingly disconnected, atomized public sphere. This is a familiar critique -- as a grad student in Chicago last year, I remember a student in the campus newspaper voicing a similar dissatisfaction with the popularity of iPods and other mp3 players on campus -- he argued that, lost in our private worlds of music, we fail to reach out and connect with one another.

Certainly, I wonder about the social impact of new technology -- particularly, that strange contradiction between identical yet personalizable mass goods. This contrast sometimes spurs me to imagine us iPod users as "customizeable automatons," fooled into a myth of self-determination because we can tailor each assembly-line product to fit our alleged individual needs. But this issue remains a stubbornly complex one of the relationship between technology and society, which rests on a number of assumptions which ought to be considered a little more carefully.

Most broadly, technology does not simply progress in some ineluctable, linear manner according to unbiased scientific advances, as Raymond Williams demonstrated many years ago. Technology is inseparable from culture, and depends on the vested interests of those with power and resources. New technological needs arise according to new social forms, frequently dependent on innovations produced for entirely different purposes (such as military applications -- think of binary code, or the internet). The potential social effects of new technology cannot be considered separately from other kinds of social change, like increasing mobility.

When fearmongering about the effect of new gadgets on the social sphere, writers like Winn seem to assume a simple relationship between social change and technology, where the rise of cell phones and iPods inevitably leads to social alienation. But what's more, this view requires a particular understanding of a public sphere that I just don't find convincing. Before you had an iPod or a cellphone, did you regularly engage in conversations with strangers in the street, on the bus, or walking across campus? If society has become increasingly atomized, I don't think the problem has to do with new tech gadgets that absorb us into our own private worlds, but with a use of social spaces that may not fit our current social needs.

I remember commuting to work before iPods and cellphones were ubiquitous (though Walkmans, of course, came out in the '80s -- why all the hubbub now?). I was always careful to bring a book with me to read on the train from Cambridge to downtown Boston, or a newspaper, and even if I didn't, I rarely spoke with anyone during the walk from my apartment or to my office. Or when I was in college in the late nineties -- walking across campus, you might occasionally nod to a familiar face from class, but the "public sphere" of walkways and lawns didn't really constitute a prime site of social engagement. Getting lunch with friends, socializing in the dorms, working together in the library -- those spaces better allowed for creating social connections, and were necessarily more specialized than some generic "public" space because they allowed you to meet people through an existing connection, like a mutual friend, shared class or communal housing. In fact, both then and more recently, technological wonders like instant messaging and WiFi contributed to social activity. In college, I used used ICQ to chat with my friends across campus or even on other campuses. As a grad student last year, WiFi in the school library allowed for chatting and sharing music while working, because while loud voices were prohibited, typing was not.

Ultimately, I question whether or not mobile communications and media devices really interfere with the public sphere, or simply provide communications and media for increasingly mobile populations. Now I no longer have to sit near the phone in order to talk to my mom back east, and I can bring music with me instead of (or alongside) books and magazines when travelling or commuting. If opportunities for social interaction are dwindling in late modern society, we need to look at how social spaces are produced and sustained. Most communal spaces these days are either private or commercial -- I can invite friends over to my home, or meet up with them in a cafe or a nightclub. Communal public space does not feature prominently in modern urban areas, and to the extent that it does, people still seek out others with whom they already have some kind of friendship or common interest. If building community and social capital is at issue, then we must consider the ways in which community is created in a mobile society. Technology, in fact, can and does facilitate the production of "communities of practice," disseminating information and connecting people according to existing social networks. Our sprawling, mobile, mediated mass society may indeed invite a level of social fragmentation that undermines social capital, but laying the blame on the latest tech toys simply misses the broader picture.